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NOTES
THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF QUI TAM
I. INTRODUCTION
Within the past two years, there has been an attempt to revive the
ancient, almost forgotten procedure known as qui tam.' This attempt
was inspired by a House Committee of Government Operations report'
which stated that qui tam suits could be brought to enforce the Refuse
Act of 1899.1 In the report, the committee claimed the Refuse Act
provided for qui tam suits to encourage enforcement of the act.'
Encouraged by the report and unaware of its flaws,5 environmental
protection groups and other private parties filed several qui tam suits.'
1. English authorities considered qui tam primarily an action, 1 M. BACON, A
NEW ABRmGEMENT OF THE LAW 87-102 (with Bowier's notes 1856) [hereinafter cited
as BACON], or an information, 2 W. HAwKINs, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF TnE
CROWN 368-91 (8th ed. 1824) [hereinafter cited as HAWK NS]. In this note, qui tam
will be referred to as a suit or procedure with the more restrictive denominations em-
ployed when appropriate. Furthermore, all qui tam suits will be dealt with together
except when separate treatment is warranted.
2. STAFF OF CONSERVATION & NATURAL RESOURCES SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, 91st CONG., 2D SEss., Qu TAm ACTIONS AND THE 1899
REFUSE ACT: CITIZEN LAWSUITS AGAINST POLLUTION OF THE NATION'S WATERWAYS
(Comm. Print 1970) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
3. Federal Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-13 (1970).
4. STAFF REPORT 17.
5. The committee cited Supreme Court discussions of similar statutes, but these
statements were either dicta or inapplicable. Authority to sue qui tam was provided
by a clear implication in three of the cases: Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212 (1905);
Francis v. United States, 72 U.S. 388 (1866); Adams, qui tam, v. Woods, 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 336 (1805). In United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537
(1943), the Court stated:
Statutes providing for a reward to informers which do not specifically either
authorize or forbid the informer [qui tam] actions are construed to authorize
him to sue.
Id. at 541 n.4. This footnote in Justice Black's opinion relied on Adams, qui tam,
v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805) and as such is an overstatement of the test
for when qui tam is provided. See notes 107-112 infra and accompanying text.
See also United States, qui tam, Matthews v. Florida Vanderbilt Development Corp.,
326 F. Supp. 289, 290 n.1 (S.D. Fla. 1971). The court there erroneously attributed
the footnote to Justice Clark.
6. At this time twelve qui tam suits have been filed in federal courts to enforce
the Refuse Act: E.B. Mitchell v. Tennero Chemicals, Inc., 331 F. Supp. 1031 (D.S.C.
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The plaintiffs contended that when a statute gives a share of a penalty
to an informer the informer may sue qui tam unless the act specifically
precludes such a suit. Thus, they argued, permission to sue qui tam
was provided for in the penalty provision of the Refuse Act:
Every person and every corporation that shall violate, or that shall
knowingly aid, abet, authorize, or instigate a violation of the provision
of sections 407, 408, and 409 of this title shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor, and on conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not ex-
ceeding $2,500 nor less than $500, or by imprisonment, (in the case of
a natural person) for not less than thirty days nor more than one year,
or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court,
one-half of said fine to be paid to the person or persons giving informa-
tion which shall lead to conviction.7 [emphasis added.]
In all of these cases, the defendants' motions for dismissal were
granted for lack of standing, lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a
claim.8 Although each court supported its decisions with varying ra-
tionales, a common theme emerges from the decisions-the courts that
dismissed these actions did not clearly understand qui tam. As a re-
sult, although these decisions may preclude the use of qui tam to en-
force the Refuse Act, they do not answer the questions of when and
how qui tam may be used. This note examines these questions.
The note traces the origin and English development of qui tam
together with the adoption, development and subsequent demise of
qui tam in America. It then considers the current Refuse Act cases.
Unfortunately these cases only discuss what qui tam does not include
and therefore serve as a negative example. From these cases, how-
1971); Lavagnino v. Porto Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971);
Gerbing v. I.T.T. Rayonier, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Connecticut
Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp. 695 (D. Conn.), afI'd, - F.2d
- (2d Cir. 1971). Bass Angler's Sportsman's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F.
Supp. 339 (E.D. Tenn. 1971); Enquist v. Quaker Oats Co., 327 F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb.
1971); United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D.
Minn. 1971); United States, qui tam, Matthews v. Florida-Vanderbilt Development
Corp., 326 F. Supp. 289 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Reuss v. Moss-American, Inc., 323 F. Supp.
848 (E.D. Wis. 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion
Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 302 (S.D. Texas 1971); Bass Anglers Sportsman's Soc'y v.
U.S. Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971);
Duming v. I.T.T Rayonier, Inc, 325 F. Supp. 447 (N.D. Wash. 1971). For a thorough
discussion of the courts' treatment of qui tam in these cases see notes 134-60, infra and
accompanying text.
7. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1969).
8. See notes 134-60 infra and accompanying text.
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ever, and from the history of qui tam the note delineates the current
status of qui tam and provides a guide for its future use.
11. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
Qui tam is the accepted abbreviation for the phrase "qui tam p 'o
domino rege quam pro seipso."'  The literal translation of this ex-
pression is, "he who as much for the king as for himself." The
meaning of the expression is that the party bringing the action or in-
formation does so as much for the king's as for his own private in-
terest.' A qui tam suit, then, involves a combination of two distinct
interests; one of which is public, the other private. This manner
of combining interests is unique to qui tam."
Qui tam has roots in the formative stages of English law. Since
the thirteenth century qui tam suits have consolidated royal and private
interests. Although unified in a single suit, the interests remained
distinct.
Traditionally in English law, the king's interests were a separate
and special class of private interests. As sovereignty developed na-
tional status, this notion of the king's interests underwent alteration. 12
Although some of the king's interests remained immediate and per-
sonal to him, 3 others, directed towards the general well being of the
9. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 160 (1st ed.
1768) [hereinafter cited as BLACKSTONE].
10. 1 BACON 87. It was acknowledged that the king's interest was generally a
public interest. 3 HAWKINS 369. Some statutes provided that the poor fund or some
public use should receive a share of the penalty. Pie v. Deane, 80 Eng. Rep. 396,
Hobart 250 (K.B. 1617); 3 BLACKSTONE 160.
11. Although the legal term "joinder" was not utilized in the early English law, it
is evident that qui tam was, in part, a kind of joinder. In this paper qui tam will be
referred to as a joinder device even though that description was not employed in the
early courts.
12. For a discussion of the legal status of English kings, see 3 W. HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 458-69 (1923) [hereinafter cited as HoLDswoRTH]; F.
POLLOCH & F. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 511-26 (2d ed. 1923).
13. Examples include: the king's interest in lands held under royal tenure, Prior
of Lewes v. Master Roger de Holt [1300], Select Cases In the Exchequer of Pleas,
48 Selden Society 198 (1931); an interest in the safety and well-being of his men,
Rex et John Gobbard v. Hanville, Select Cases In the Exchequer of Pleas, 48 Selden
Society 215 (1931); and the dignity of the crown, Baldwin Tyrel's Case (1214),
Select Pleas of the Crown, 1200-1225, 1 Selden Society 67 (1888). For a partial
listing of the king's personal interests, see 2 HAwKINS 369.
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kingdom, became public.' 4 These public interests were frequently ex-
pressed in statutes. 15
The interests of private parties in a qui tam proceeding were also
of two types.' 6 The first type included the interests of persons who
had allegedly suffered a wrong."" These aggrieved parties sued for a
redress of their grievances. The second type comprised the interests
of common informers.' s These parties sued to recover a part of a
14. Such a royal interest often involved wrongful use of authority. In Reyne v.
Heale, 86 Eng. Rep. 84, 1 Ventris 122 (K.B. 1671), a justice of the peace was sued
qui tam for refusing to enforce the law and "put down a conventricle." A sheriff in
Barret v. Winchcomb, 79 Eng. Rep. 309, Cro. Jac. 360 (K.B. 1614), was sued qui tam
for allowing a prisoner to escape. In this case the crown did not recover a monetary
penalty. Parkhurst v. Powell, 79 Eng. Rep. 456, Cro. Jac. 532 (K.B. 1619) is a similar
case in which a sheriff was sued qui tam for issuing a deceitful return. Not dissimilar
were the statutes delineating the jurisdiction of Admiralty courts, 13 Rich. 2, c.5 (1382);
15 Rich., c.3 (1194). The penalty for incorrectly bringing a suit in the courts of
Admiralty was a recovery of double damages by the party aggrieved and a ten pound
fine for the king. 2 Hen. 4, c.11 (1400). For an interesting case discussing this
statute, see Sands v. Child, 87 Eng. Rep. 332, 4 Mod. 174 (K.B. 1693). That case
does not indicate that the prosecution of the wrongdoer was accomplished by a
qui tam suit, yet it is evident that suit was brought to recover damages and to extract
a fine. In such a case it would have been proper to style the complaint qui tam.
2 HAWKINS 369.
15. E.g., statutes encouraging commerce, 27 Edw. 3, c.20 (1353), 2 Rich. 2, c.1
(1380), 2 Car. 2, c.32 (1625); statutes regulating jurisdiction, 13 Rich. 2, c.5 (1389),
15 Rich. 2, c.3 (1391); statutes regulating apprenticeship, 28 Hen. 8, c.5 (1536).
16. For a comparison of the informer's imperfect interest in the penalty for
which he was suing with the interest of the aggrieved party in his remedy, see Philipps
v. Smith, 93 Eng. Rep. 433, Strange 135 (K.B. 1719) and 2 BLACKSTONE 437.
17. Sometimes this recovery was sought in a common law action. 2 HAWKiNs
369. Additionally, an aggrieved party could sue as a common informer, but some
statutes included an express provision permitting suits only by aggrieved parties.
These were also considered penal statutes, but were regarded differently from informer
provisions. 3 J. STEPHEN, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 585 (1868).
18. It was clear that a common informer's suit belonged to the informer. It was
not the king's suit. Kirkham v. Wheeley, 91 Eng. Rep. 31, Salkeld 29 (K.B. 1965).
The informer's rights to the penalty did not attach until the suit was instituted, where-
upon his rights attached absolutely and to the exclusion of all other potential informers.
3 BLACKSTONE 160. However, if the crown brought suit before an informer, the king
stood to recover the entire penalty. Rex v. Hymen, 101 Eng. Rep. 1118, 7 T.R. 535
(K.B. 1798). In either case, the crown could pardon only its potential share of the
penalty that was being sued for. Dr. Foster's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1222, 11 Co. Rep. 56a
(K.B. 1614); Stretton, qui tam, v. Tayler, 78 Eng. Rep. 395, Cro. Eliz. 138 (Q.B. 1589).
In most cases the informer would be provided a designated share of the penalty.
3 BLACKSTONE 160. However, there is some evidence that a conspirator could gain a
pardon by confessing his crime and turning in his fellow wrongdoer. L. RADziNOWICZ,
A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAw 33-56 (1957).
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penalty"9 and were thus a class of bounty hunters.20 In comparison
with the aggrieved party, an informer was motivated by the chance of
gain, not by the need for recovery. This distinction, combined with
the overzealous pursuit of bounty, eventually lead to a general distrust
of the informer. Initially qui tam proceedings were not dependent
upon statutory authority. An aggrieved party brought a qui tam suit
to obtain a common law remedy in the royal courts for a private
wrong that also affected the king's interests.2 Only by alleging a
royal interest could a private party gain access to the royal courts,
since in the thirteenth century these courts generally considered only
matters involving the king.22  At that time local courts had general
jurisdiction over private wrongs. The adequacy and fairness of the
proceedings conducted in local courts were uneven at best. Plaintiffs
sought access to the royal courts, which were successfully expand-
ing their jurisdiction. Various techniques were devised to expand
the jurisdiction of royal courts to include the area of private wrongs. 23
Qui tam was one of these techniques. This subsequent expansion
of jurisdiction culminated in the emergence of royal courts as the
principal forum for settling all legal disputes. By the fourteenth
century, royal courts heard suits involving private wrongs without
requiring the use of techniques such as qui tam. Consequently,
as the need for the non-statutory qui tam proceeding disappeared, the
use of it likewise faded.24 Nevertheless, English authorities as late as
the nineteenth century asserted its continuing availability. 25
But even as non-statutory qui tam fell into disuse, statutes began to
19. For a partial list of acts which permitted common informer suits, see 21 Jac.,
c. 28 (1623) (discussed in 3 COKE, INSTITUTES 191) [hereinafter cited as COKE, INsr.];
and Schedule to The Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c. 39 (1951).
20. Informers have been referred to as "lewd" and "the worst kind of people". M.
DAVIs, THE ENFORCEMENT OF ENGLISH APPRENTICESIP 63 (1956) [hereinafter cited
as DAVIES].
21. See cases cited note 13 supra. See also Milsom, Trespass From Henry III to
Edward 111, 74 LAW Q. Ryv. 429 n.49, 50 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Milsom].
22. Milsom 585.
23. Private parties who wanted to get their suit before the royal courts adopted
various means to plead such an interest. Some of the techniques employed included:
a demand for punitive damages, 2 HOLnswoRTH 369, 449; an allegation of "contra
pacem", Milsom 575; an allegation of aggravating circumstances which constituted a loss
to the king, id. at 429.
24. Cases were brought in the common law qui tam manner in the fourteenth
century. The damage to the king was added as an aggravation to the private party's
damages. Milsom 429.
25. 2 HAWKINs 369.
Vol. 1972:81]
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appear that permitted private parties to initiate actions to redress
public wrongs. In some of these statutes the plaintiff was required
to have suffered some particular injury over and above the public
wrong; he had to be an aggrieved party. In others, any informer
could initiate the action.
In the early stages of English criminal law, enforcement of penal
statutes was limited by the lack of an effective public police force.20
To rectify this inadequacy, the courts permitted private accusers to
bring bills to enforce penal laws."' In the fourteenth century, Parli-
ment enacted the first statute which permitted a private informer to
sue for the violation of a penal law, and gave the private prosecutor
a one-fourth share of the penalty imposed upon conviction of the
wrongdoer.2 There was no requirement that the private prosecutor
have suffered any individualized injury. Similar provisions appeared
in statutes sporadically until the sixteenth century.20 At that time
Parliament began to utilize the qui tam provision for the execution
of a broad spectrum of penal statutes. 0
Parliament enacted the first qui tam statute for aggrieved parties in
1400.1 This statute provided penalties for violations of the statute
which limited the jurisdiction of Admirality courts. A party improp-
erly subjected to suit in an Admirality court could, in turn, sue his
prosecutor for double damages and a fine, payable to the king, of ten
pounds. Defendants to the improper suits were the persons most in-
terested in the enforcement of the statute, so these defendants were
given the power to prosecute violators. Consequently, the aggrieved
26. On the use of informers as a police force and the subsequent abuses see 2 L.
RADziNowIcz, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW 33-167 (1957). On the use
of criminal informations to enforce penal laws, see 9 HOLDSWORTH 236-38.
27. For example, the king's council relied upon private informers or accusors as
early as the thirteenth century. Select Cases Before the King's Council, 1243-1482,
35 Selden Society xxxv et seq. (1918); 2 HoLDswoRTH 197-199.
28. Statute Prohibiting the Sale of Wares After Close of Fair, 5 Edw. 3, c.5, § 6
(1331).
29. For a list of some early English statutes which could be pursued by informers,
see 21 Jac., c.28 (1623). This statute repealed many obsolete informer statutes.
30. In the sixteenth century informers were also being employed to enforce com-
mercial regulations, 4 HOLDSWORTH 355, and apprenticeship laws, DAvis 30. At the
same time a system of paid inspectors was being developed. These inspectors were
akin to professional informers. 4 HOLDSWORTH 369; DAvins 32.
31. A Remedy For Him Who Is Wrongfully Pursued In Admiralty Court, 2 Hen.
4, c.11 (1400).
[Vol. 1972:81
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defendant simultaneously recovered for his loss and enforced the stat-
utory proscription. -2 Some subsequent statutes specified a period of
time during which only an aggrieved party could bring an action on
the statute. If no aggrieved party prosecuted within the designated
period, an informer would then be permitted to sue out the penalty
and recover a share.3
All qui tam statutes, then, included two elements: (1) private
prosecutors shared in the penalty; (2) private persons could initiate a
suit to recover the penalty. 4 If the private prosecutor was successful,
he would get a share of the penalty, and the king or some public use
would get the remainder.
Qui tam was not a form of action. It was, rather, a means of
bringing an action. Consequently the thirteenth century non-statutory
qui tam plaintiff filed his suit in an ordinary general writ 35 as if he
were suing to recover for an ordinary wrong.
At this time there was no paid informer system as such. However,
private parties, called accusers, were permitted to file bills in the king's
council to prosecute violations of the criminal law.3 6 These early in-
formers were not given rewards for bringing these bills. Eventually,
however, the bounty-hunting aspect of private prosecution was adopted
into English law. Informers were then given a share of whatever
penalty they recovered. These informers were permitted to file either
an indictment or popular action against a defendant.37  The suit
32. Bylota v. Pointel, 73 Eng. Rep. 346, 2 Dyer 159b (K.B. 1558).
33. See, e.g., An Act for the Better Preventing Excessive and Deceitful Gaming, 9
Anne, c.14, § 2 (1710).
34. Fleming, qui tam, v. Bailey, 102 Eng. Rep. 1090, 5 East 313 (K.B. 1804); Bar-
nard v. Gostling, 102 Eng. Rep. 487, 2 East 569 (K.B. 1802); BAcoN 88; 2 HAWmNS
368. There were instances where the courts allowed an informer to prosecute a wrong-
doer even though the informer did not stand to gain a share of the penalty, but these
cases do not fall within the ambits of qui tam. Roe v. Roe, 145 Eng. Rep. 443, Handres
185 (K.B. 1661); Maiden v. Bartlett, 145 Eng. Rep. 727, Parker 105 (K.B. 1750),
noting Cuff v. Vachel, 123 Eng. Rep. 395, And. 138 (C.P. 1505) to the contrary.
A private party could not institute a suit to recover a part of a penalty which was to go
to the poor fund. Dickinson v. Clarke, 84 Eng. Rep. 518, 2 Keble 820 (K.B. 1671);
Pie v. Deane, 80 Eng. Rep. 396, Hobart 250 (K.B. 1617).
35. Milsom 429.
36. Select Cases Before the King's Council, 1243-1482, 35 Selden Society xxxvii
(1918).
37. See Preamble, 4 Hen. 7, c.20 (1487). "But, more usually, these forfeitures
created by statute are given at large, to any common informer; or, in other words, to
any such person or persons as will sue for the same; and hence such actions are called
Vol. 1972:81]
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would demand the full penalty, but only part of it would go to the
private informer. In 1576, Parliament provided the first statute" lim-
iting the means of prosecution at the informers' disposal. The statute
was not clear. It was read to limit informers' suits to informations or
original actions, and some courts dismissed informer's suits brought
in any other manner. 9 The courts were not uniform, however, in
their interpretation of this statute and its procedural limitation.40  Par-
liament clarified the matter in 1623 by enacting a statute which per-
mitted informers to sue by means of popular action, bill, plaint, or
information.4 1  This was the last statute which considered the manner
in which an informer could bring a suit. Since that time, when in-
formers have been permitted to sue qui tam, they have been given the al-
ternative of bringing their suit as a criminal or civil proceeding. The
consequences of this choice were the manner in which the courts con-
ducted the suit.
Initially, qui tam informers could bring indictments.4 2  However,
with the increased utilization of the informer's provision, Parliament
chose to limit informers' criminal prosecutions to informations.4 8  Par-
liament retained this limit without modification until the informer's
suit was abolished in 1951 4 Proceedings begun by qui tam infor-
mations, were handled as were other criminal proceedings.4
popular actions, because they are given to the people in general." [Emphasis added] 3
BLAcKsrONE 160.
38. 18 Eliz. c.5 (1576).
39. Gadley v. Whitecot, 78 Eng. Rep. 790, Cro. Eliz. 544 (Q.B. 1596).
40. 2 HAWKINs 371-72. There was considerable dispute as to whether the implied
restriction applied to aggrieved parties. Compare Gabriel Widow v. Clerke, 78 Eng.
Rep. 336, Cro. Eliz. 76 (Q.B. 1587) holding that the restriction applied to all penal
actions with Johnson v. Pays, 78 Eng. Rep. 675, Cro. Eliz. 435 (Q.B. 1595), which
held that aggrieved parties were not covered by the restriction.
41. 21 Jac., c.4 (1623).
42. See Preamble, 4 Hen. 7, c.20 (1487).
43. An indictment was brought at the oath of twelve men while an information
was brought at the suit of the king's attorney or a private informer. 2 HAWKINs 357.
For a discussion of the early history and the development of the information, see
9 HoLDswoRTH 236-45.
44. The Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. 6, c.39 (1951).
45. E.g., Quakers could not testify, Atcheson v. Everitt, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142,
Cowp. 382 (K.B. 1775); amendments to pleadings were not permitted, Philips v.
Smith, 93 Eng. Rep. 433, Strange 136 (K.B. 1715); a defendant could plead "not
guilty", and the Attorney General could reply non vult prosequi or pardon the king's
share, Hammon v. Gryffith, 78 Eng. Rep. 826, Cro. Eliz. 583 (Q.B. 1597); Dr.
Foster's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1222, 11 Co. Rep. 56b (K.B. 1614). There seems to be a
two-fold reason for this. First, the information filled the void left by the decline of the
[Vol. 1972:81
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As an alternative, an informer could chose to sue qui tam in a civil
proceeding.46 Such a proceeding would be subjected to the same lim-
itations as other civil suits. Initially, then, a qui tam suit was unique
only because it combined the private interest of the prosecutor and the
public interest in enforcing the statute.
In time, the informer provisions became subject to several forms
of abuse.47  The first form included the collusive use of qui tam
suits to permit a wrongdoer to escape the effect of a penalty. A
friend of the wrongdoer would bring suit and either obtain a con-
fessed judgment for a small part of the penalty or permit the wrong-
doer to prevail at a feigned trial.48 The second form of abuse in-
cluded the vexatious use of qui tam suits by overly aggressive in-
formers who prosecuted little known and obsolete violations.49
Coke indicates that the public was outraged by these abuses. 50 In
response to this outrage, Parliment enacted provisions designed to curb
the abuses. These provisions imposed several restrictions on informer
suits.
The first attempt to curb the abuses was a wholesale abolition of
the informer provisions. This attempt proved unworkable since in-
formers were still needed to enforce the penal laws of England.5
Subsequent attempted cures either imposed procedural restrictions or
penalized the wrongdoing informer. The first procedural restriction
eliminated the preclusive effect of collusive suits.52 By removing the
criminal appeal. 9 HOLDSWORTH 230. See also Select Cases Before the King's
Council 1243-1482, 35 Selden Society xxxvi-vii (1918). Secondly, the information was
an alternative to the indictment. Thus, conceptually a qui tam information was a
criminal prosecution. For a more recent discussion of the question of whether qui tam
was a criminal or civil proceeding see Atchison v. Everitt, 98 Eng. Rep. 1142, Cowp.
382 (K.B. 1775).
46. Either as a suit in debt, Barns v. Hughs, 83 Eng. Rep. 391, Lev. 248 (K.B.
1668), or as an action on the case, Barret v. Winchcomb, 79 Eng. Rep. 309, Cro.
Jac. 360 (K.B. 1614). Debt seems to have been preferred. 1 J. CHTrLY, A PRACTICAL
TiRxisE ON PLEADING 104 (1809).
47. For a thorough discussion of these abuses and the subsequent attempts to
curb them, see DAvIEs 63-76.
48. For a summary of the possible collusive techniques which could be em-
ployed, see Preamble, 4 Hen. 7, c.20 (1488). This act attempted to cure the collusive
abuses. It did so, in part, by providing that the first man to inform had a vested right
to the suit. This right was not lost unless the first informer misbehaved.
49. 3 COKE, INST. 191-92.
50. Id.
51. DAVIES 63.
52. 4 Hen. 7, c.20 (1487).
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incentive for collusion, Parliament eliminated this abuse. Several years
later, Parliament addressed the problem of informer harassment. In
1576, Parliament passed a statute which provided a two-fold attack on
informers. One part of the statute provided for the imposition of
penalties on vexatious informers. Another part of the statute per-
mitted defendants to recover their court costs from harassing inform-
ers.54  In 1587 Parliament enacted further legislation. This statute
imposed two procedural restrictions, a one year statute of limitations",
and a strict venue requirement.50  Finally, in 1623, Parliament en-
acted sweeping legislation to curb the informer abuses.Y The statute
consisted of three parts. In the first part, obsolete informer provisions
were repealed. The second section included a stricter venue re-
quirement than the earlier statute. Finally, the third section affected
changes in the details of pleading. These changes ameliorated some of
the harsh procedural rules which were imposed on the qui tam defen-
dant. This statute along with the cumulative impact of all the earlier
legislation accomplished the long sought reform of most of the in-
former abuses.58 The restrictive provisions applied only to qui tam
suits brought by informers. Neither the king nor an aggrieved party
was affected by this legislation. 59
Thus in the seventeenth century the qui tam concept had wide ac-
ceptance in England. Non-statutory qui tam actions may still have
been possible, but this was by no means certain. On the other hand,
statutory versions of qui tam were very much in evidence. The two
forms of statutory qui tam, one for informers, the other for aggrieved
parties, though derived from similar sources, were subject to such dif-
ferent procedural limitations as to make them quite dissimilar. The
53. 18 Eliz., c.5, § 4 (1576).
54. 18 Eliz., c.5, § 3(3) (1576). See, e.g., Wilkinson, qui tam, v. Allot, 98 Eng.
Rep. 1133, Cowp. 366 (K.B. 1775) (non suited plaintiff had to pay defendants costs).
In comparison a successful informer would not be rewarded costs. Frederick v.
Lookup, 98 Eng. Rep. 51, 4 Burr. 2018 (K.B. 1767).
55. 31 Eliz., c.5, § 5 (1589).
56. 31 Eliz., c.5, § 2 (1589).
57. 21 Jac., c.4 (1623). For a detailed analysis of this statute see 3 COKE, INST.
191-94.
58. The success of James I in comparison to the Tudor monarchs may have
been due to a more aggressive opposition to informers or to the gradual buildup of
provisions controlling the abuses. 4 HoLDSWORTH 359.
59. 31 Eliz., c.5 (1589) was applied to informers, Pomfreit v. Brownsal, 78 Eng.
Rep. 968, Cro. Eliz. 735 (Q.B. 1600), but not to aggrieved parties, Allen v. Stear,
78 Eng. Rep. 885, Cro. Eliz. 645 (Q.B. 1598).
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aggrieved party statutes provided remedies, while the informer statutes
provided for a share of the penalty. There was the added confusion as
to whether an aggrieved party had to proceed qui tam if that avenue
was open to him.6 0 Finally, qui tam suits could be brought in either
a civil or criminal proceeding.
This mass of confusion and complexity continued unsorted through-
out the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It was this confusion
that the American colonies inherited when they adopted English law.
II. AMERICAN ADOPTION OF Qui TAM
The extent and method of the reception of English law by the
American colonies and states is a problem which does not lend itself
to easy resolution. As expressed by Cardozo:
One of the chief difficulties confronting a student of our legal history
is that the whole subject of the reception of English law, both common
and statutory, was not thought out in any consistent way but was left
unsettled and in the air. The plaint was a common one that no one
can tell what is law and what is not in the plantations.0'
In substantially all of the states, English statutes enacted by a speci-
fied date were expressly adopted by legislative acts."' Section 35 of
the New York Constitution of 1777 is typical of the general enact-
ments of state legislators:
such parts. . . of the statute law of England and Great Britain, and of
acts of the legislature of the colony of New York, as together did form
the law of said colony on the 19th day of April in the year of our Lord
1775, shall be and continue the law of this state.6 3 [Emphasis added.]
60. There was some question whether an aggrieved party could pursue his common
law remedy without joining the king's interest if the qui tam remedy were available.
See, e.g., Lady Waterhouse v. Bawde, 79 Eng. Rep. 116, Cro. Jac. 133 (K.B. 1606)
(judgment for defendant where plaintiff failed to sue qui tam); Lord Townsend v. Dr.
Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994 (1003), 2 Mod. 150 (K.B. 1676) (dictum).
61. Beers v. Hotchkiss, 256 N.Y. 41, 54, 175 N.E. 506, 511 (1931). See also
United States v. Worral, 2 U.S. 384 (1798), where the court expressed a similar con-
fusion over the same question.
62. See, e.g., United States v. Park Motors, 107 F. Supp. 168, 176 (E.D. Tenn.
1952), and Menne v. City of Fond du Lac, 273 Wis. 341, 77 N.W.2d 703 (1956).
63. 1 Laws of the State of New York 15 (Kent-Radcliff Rev. 1802). See also
similar statutes in Pennsylvania, Acts of the Gen. Ass. of Pa., Session of 1776-77,
C. DCCXXVI [1 Laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 1700-1810, 429 (1810)]
and in Virginia, Ordinances of Convention, C. 5, S VI [9 Hening, Stat. at Large Va.
127 (1821)].
American courts had the complex task of determining specifically what part of the
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These provisions made it clear the state legislatures intended to adopt
English statutory law.
Determining what part of the English decisional law, in contrast to
the statutory law was received is a more disputed issue. Most courts
would agree that the Pre-Revolutionary decisions of the English courts
interpreting English statutes were to be given great weight. '4 Com-
menting on the reception of these decisions, Gray wrote: "The de-
cisions of the English courts after the settlement of the colonies and be-
fore the Revolution had as great and direct an influence, as a matter of
fact, upon the decisions of this country as if they had been considered
binding authorities."65
English law was applicable and controlling. The task confused and frustrated some
courts to the point where one court declared that it would not listen to citations from
"musty, old worm eaten books." It further stated that "not Common Law-not the
quirks of Coke and Blackstone but common sense" would control its decisions.
C. W AXRV r, A I-STORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR, 227 (1966).
During the Revolution, many of the colonies rashly rejected nearly everything
English, to the point where some colonial legislatures passed acts rejecting English
law. But the initial rejection was short lived. See, An Act Prohibiting the Reading of
Certain Reports in the Commonwealth (approved 1808), reprinted in 3 THE STATUTE
LAw OF KENTUCKY 457 (Littel ed. 1811), and R. POUND, THE SPmrr OF THE COMMON
LAW, 116-117 (1921).
After the Revolution the former colonists proceeded to adopt selectively that part
of the English law which was applicable to the American venture. In his commen-
taries, Kent described this process in the following way:
A great proportion of the rules and maxims which constitute the immense
code of the common law grew into use by gradual adoption, and received
from time to time, the sanctions of the courts of justice, without any legisla-
tive act of interference. . . . [The English Common Law] has been as-
sumed by the courts of justice, or declared by statute, with the like modifica-
tions, as the law of the land in every state. It was imported by our
colonial ancestors, as far as it was applicable, and was sanctioned by royal
charters and colonial statutes.
J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 471 (1826). See also Pope, The English
Common Law in United States, 24 HARv. L. REv. 6, 13 (1910) [hereinafter cited as
Pope].
Chief Justice Shaw would have agreed with Kent's general evaluation. Speaking
specifically on the adoption of English statutes, the Massachusetts Chief Justice said:
The general rule in regard to English statutes is, that all statutes in amend-
ment of the common law . .. which were made before the emigration of
our ancestors, and which were applicable ... to the laws and institutions
founded here, are deemed to be a part of the common law, as adopted by our
ancestors and transmitted to us.
Wilbur v. Tobey, 33 Mass. 177, 182 (1833). See also United States v. Park
Motors, 107 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Tenn. 1952).
64. See United States v. Park Motors, 107 F. Supp. 168 (E.D. Tenn. 1952);
Menne v. City of Fond du lac, 273 Wis. 341, 77 N.W.2d 703 (1956).
65. J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 232 (1892).
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Another American authority concluded:
The truth of the matter is, therefore, that the greater part of the law of
the states which is in fact identical with the common law of England
does not consist of the common law of England which was adopted
and made binding upon our courts, but it consists of rules established
by the English courts which have in fact been accepted and followed,
without regard to the dates of the English decisions establishing such
rules, and without consideration of the question whether such decisions
are a part of the adopted common law and binding upon our courts
or not.66
There are, then, two basic views on the adoption of English law.
One view asserts the whole of the common law of England was adopted
in this country. 7 The conflicting view asserts the adoption of the com-
mon law of England meant not the adoption of the whole common law,
but the adoption of the common law as it existed in England prior to some
particular period so that only the English cases prior to that time be-
came binding upon the courts in this country. 6 The only conclusion
that can be drawn from these conflicting authorities is that the courts
of this country are not bound by the decisions of the English courts,
but may look to these decisions to ascertain the principles and rules
of the common law. The English decisions may be considered as in-
dicative of what the common law was at any time in the past or what
it may be in the present. 9
Applying these general principles to qui tam, it is apparent that
qui tam as it existed in England7 0 could have been received in the
United States in three ways. First, the common law qui tam action
66. Pope 18. Pope concluded that when American courts disapproved of an Eng-
lish decision, "the usual method of avoiding their conclusions was by saying that
the English decisions were not the law but only evidence of the law." Id. at 16.
67. Chilcott v. Hart, 23 Colo. 40, 45 P. 391 (1896); Williams v. Miles, 68 Neb.
463, 96 N.W. 151 (1903).
68. See People v. Williams, 145 Ill. 573, 33 N.E. 849 (1893); Guest v. Reynolds,
68 Ill. 478 (1873); Gerber v. Grabel, 16 Ill. 217 (1854). For an example of the
effects of these different theories of adoption on the laws of negotiable instruments, see
F. BEUTEL, BEuTEL'S BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT LAW 48-51 (7th ed. 1948).
69. Pope 16.
70. Learned Hand, in Sutherland v. International Ins. Co. of New York, 43 F.2d
969 (2nd Cir. 1930), noted, "This was a qui tam action, well known in England,
whence we imported it. . . ." Id. at 970. The court in State v. Smith, 49 N.H. 155
(1870) similarly compared the usage of qui tam in England and this country and noted
that several states were employing a type of informer provision to enforce their
criminal laws.
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by which an aggrieved party sought to redress his injuries may have
been adopted generally along with other portions of the common law.
Secondly, specific English statutes which could be enforced by a qui
tam suit may have been adopted by colonial or state legislatures.
Thirdly, American legislatures may have used English law as a model
for qui tam provisions in American statutes.
No evidence has been found of a common law qui tam suit in our
early history. It seems unlikely that American colonial lawyers were
familiar with the early use of qui tam as a common law device to
bring a suit in a royal as opposed to local court. Despite the acknowl-
edgement of the common law qui tam's existence by some eighteenth
century English authorities, 71 its usage in English courts was minimal
or nonexistent during that period. This sparse usage may also explain
its absence in American courts. Although theoretically a non-statu-
tory qui tam may have been adopted together with the rest of the
English common law, no actual cases to support the theory have been
found.
There are, however, numerous examples of statutory qui tam in
early American history. Many colonies expressly adopted in toto cer-
tain English statutes which could be enforced by qui tam procedures. 72
In addition, other statutes were adopted with minor modifications.7"
Moreover, American legislatures did use qui tam provisions similar to
those found in English statutes. An example of this form of reception
was the use of informers to enforce penal laws. 74  This technique
was employed in two ways. First, some statutes permitted informers
or aggrieved parties to sue qui tam.7" Secondly, other statutes pro-
71. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
72. E.g., The Miller's Toll in Colonial Connecticut. This provision was originally
enacted in 1672 and was still being enforced in 1828. State v. Bishop, 7 Conn. 181
(1828).
73. The penalty provisions of the early New Jersey Gaming Law, Act of Feb. 8,
1797 §§ IV, V [18001 N.J. Laws 224-25 (repealed 1847) were very similar to the
English Gaming Law, 9 Anne, c.14, § 2 (1710). The court noted in Marvin v. Trout,
199 U.S. 212, 225 (1905) that informer statutes had been employed in America "since
the foundation of our Government."
74. For a partial list of qui tam statutes, see STAFF REPORT supra note 2, at 3-4.
75. Usually informers were private parties with no connection with the state, but
in Tarde v. Benseman, 31 Texas 277 (1868) a tax assessor brought an action qul tam
for the violation of a revenue statute. Coincidentally, this was similar to the use of
paid inspectors to enforce commercial law during the reign of Elizabeth. See note 30
supra.
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vided rewards to informers without permitting them to sue. 76
Statutes providing for qui tam suits were common in eighteenth
century America, and the notion that qui tam was a joinder of public
and private interests was generally accepted.7 7  Many statutes were in-
terpreted as giving informers the same kind of contingent interest in
the penalty as their English counterparts.78 In some instances, legisla-
tures enacted statutes which acknowledged the primacy of the first
informer's suit, thereby adopting the English attitude towards multiple
informers.79
The courts also were influenced by English law pertaining to qui
tam suits. In deciding which penal statute permitted an informer to
sue qui tam, the courts held that permission either must be expressly
granteds" or clearly implied8" in the penalty provision. In other words,
76. If a statute created a penalty without providing the means to recover it, a
qui tain suit was not authorized. State v. Smith, 49 N.H. 155 (1870); Norman v.
Dunbar, 53 N.C. 317 (1861). The court in Wheeler v. Goulding, 79 Mass. (13
Gray) 539, 542 (1859) discussed the distinctions between a qui tam statute and one
which merely provided a reward to anyone who gave information leading to a con-
viction.
77. "[The private party cannot bring the suit] but by joining the state in the
prosecution . . . ." Dickinson v. Potter, 4 Day 340, 342 (Conn. 1810). In some
cases the court referred to the state as an indispensable party. Houghton v. Havens, 6
Conn. 305, 307 (1826); Yocum v. Daniel, 24 Ky. 14 (1829). Another court said
that the penalty had to be divided between the state and a private party for the suit
to be styled qui fain. Salonen v. Farley, 82 F. Supp. 25, 28 (E.D. Ky. 1949). Some
courts required an informer to declare qui tam so that the state's interest and private
party's interest both appeared on the record. Vandeventer v. Van Court, 2 N.J.L. 155,
156 (Sup. Ct. 1807); Megargell v. Hazleton Coal Co., 8 W. & S. 342, 345 (Pa. 1845).
78. United States v. Griswold, 24 F. 361, 362 (D.C. Ore. 1885) (U.S. cannot
pardon informer's share of penalty provided under FED. REV. ST. §§ 3490-94); State v.
Smith, 64 Me. 423 (1875) (dictum); Pike v. Madburg, 12 N.H. 262 (1841); Ritchie
v. Shannon, 2 Pawle 196 (Pa. 1828).
79. For examples of state statutes which still enforce this English law [4 Hen. 7,
c. 20, §§ 4-6 (1488)], see ALA. CODE tit. 7 § 148 (1958); GA. CODE ANN. § 3-606
(1962).
80. The courts in Bush v. Republic of Texas, 1 Tex. 455 (1846); and Campbell v.
Board of Pharmacy of New Jersey, 45 N.J.L. 241 (1883) dealt with statutes which
specifically provided for enforcement by qui tam suits.
81. The strength of the implication varies with the wording. Because the implica-
tion must be clear, a presumption exists against the presence of implied authority.
Only when a provision contemplates the rewarding of one who has both discovered
and prosecuted a violation can the test of clear implication be satisfied. Thus, the
wording of such a provision encompasses only those addressed as active prosecutors.
Courts have permitted qui tam suits to be brought on the following wordings: "to
anyone who would prosecute therefore . . ."; Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Howard,
38 Ill. 414 (1865); Nye v. Lamphere, 68 Mass. 295 (1854); Thompson v. Howe,
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the English test 2 of whether or not a penalty could be recovered in a
qui tam suit was adopted by the American courts.
8 3
The reception of English law went beyond the mere recognition
that an aggrieved party or informer could sue qui tam. The reception
extended to an adoption of the English qui tam procedures and to a
utilization of the informer controls developed by Parliament. Exam-
ples of English qui tam procedures employed in American courts were
numerous. As in England, the same kinds of suits were brought by
private parties to recover the penalties,84 and a defendant in a qui tam
suit might answer either "not guilty" or "nil debet,"85 just as his Eng-
lish counterpart. Pleadings in civil actions were subject to the adopted
Statute of Jeofails.86 Procedural errors were handled in the same man-
ner as in England.T When no common informer appeared, the state
could sue for the entire penalty.88 Finally, a judgment in American
46 Barb. 287 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1866); "one who would sue for the same", Adams v. Com-
monwealth, 1 Woodward Dec. 417 (Pa. Dist. Ct. 1866); "one half to the informer and
prosecutor", Drew v. Hilliker, 56 Vt. 641 (1884); "to the use of [the informer]"
Adams, qui tam, v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1804); Higby v. People, 5
Ill. (4 Scammon) 165 (1844); Chicago & Alton R.R. Co. v. Howard, 38 Ill. 415 (1865);
Colburn v. Swett, 42 Mass. (1 Metcalf) 232 (1840) (dictum); Lynch v. the Steamer
"Economy," 27 Wis. 69 (1870); contra, Omaha & Republican Valley Ry. v. Hale,
45 Neb. 418, 63 N.W. 849 (1895); "one-half for the use of the informer ...",
Payne v. Coursey, 20 Ga. 585 (1856). The court in Smith v. Look, 108 Mass. 139
(1871) did not permit the plaintiff to proceed where the statute was phrased to give
one-half to the party making the complaint. Evidently the court interpreted the word
"complaint" in a non-legal sense.
82. See note 34 supra.
83. Some cases cite English opinions as authority: Williams v. Wells Fargo &
Express Co., 177 F. 352, 355 (8th Cir. 1910); Colbum v. Swett, 42 Mass. (1 Met-
calf) 232, 235 (1840); Drew v. Hilliker, 56 Vt. 641, 646 (1884).
84. In most cases an action in debt or action on the case was filed. However, in
Raynham v. Rounseville, 26 Mass. 44 (1829), the court said an indictment would
lie. In Adams, qui tam, v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805), Chief Justice
Marshall noted, regarding a statute prohibiting slave trade, "In this particular case, the
statute which creates the forfeiture does not prescribe the mode of demanding it;
consequently, either debt or information would lie." Id. at 340. This is a recognition
that the English statute, 18 Eliz., c.5, § 1 (1576), applied to American law. See
note 38 supra and accompanying text.
85. Burnham v. Webster, 5 Mass. 266 (1809).
86. Martin, qui tam, v. M'Night, 1 Tenn. 330 (Dist. Ct. 1808), on rehearing, 1
Tenn. 380 (Dist. Ct. 1808).
87. E.g., dismissal of a suit brought by an improper party, Burrell v. Hughes,
116 N.C. 430 (1895).
88. State v. Smith, 64 Me. 423 (1875); Commonwealth v. Howard, 13 Mass. 221
(1816).
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courts was given an effect very similar to that which an English judg-
ment would have been given in England.89
From the above discussion it seems clear that qui tam as it existed
in early America was virtually identical to English qui tam. The
colonies and newly established states adopted not only the letter but
the spirit of this unique procedure. Recognition of this wide scale
adoption provides a useful basis for determining the current propriety
of qui tam suits in certain factual settings.
IV. AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT OF Qui TAM
To some extent the American experience with qui tam informers
paralleled the English. Identical problems with vexatious and collu-
sive informers developed. In response to these problems American
legislatures employed the same remedies as Parliament.90 Informers
were required to pay costs if they did not prevail.91 Only a final
judgment was effective as a bar to a subsequent informer's suit.92
Short statutes of limitations for informers93 and strict venue statutes,94
similar to the English provision, helped control abuses. In some cases
fines were levied on wrong-doing informers. 95
In addition to the English remedies, American legislatures developed
some of their own to cure the informer abuses. Statutes were passed
giving the state the exclusive control of penal actions. By gaining
control of penal actions, the state accomplished two ends. First,
abuses perpetrated by informers were stymied; secondly, the decision
89. Beadleston v. Sprague, 6 Johns. 101 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810); Middleton v.
Wilmington & Weldon R.R., 95 N.C. 167 (1886).
90. E.g., Pennsylvania adopted 4 Hen. 7, c.20 and 22 (1487); 23 Car. 2, c.9,
reprinted in S. ROBERTS, DIGEST OF SELECT BRITISH STATUTEs 138-39 (1847).
91. Reynolds v. Stevens, 2 Root 136 (Conn. 1794); Omaha & Republican Valley
Ry. v. Hale, 45 Neb. 418, 63 N.W. 849 (1895). In Pennsylvania, malicious
prosecution by informers was punishable by an award of double costs to the aggrieved
party. Act of Nov. 27, 1700, ch. 83 [1896] 2 PA. STAT. 100 (repealed by the Queen
in Council, 1706).
92. Haskins, qui tam, v. Newcomb, 2 Johns. 405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807); Raynham
v. Rounseville, 26 Mass. 44 (1829); Burley v. Burley, 6 N.H. 200 (1833).
93. Commonwealth v. Frost, 5 Mass. 53 (1809); Pike v. Madbury, 12 N.H. 262
(1841). In Delaware, informers and aggrieved parties had the same statute of limita-
tions, tit. 18, ch. 123, § 12, [1852] DEL. REV. STAT. 441.
94. Ch. 123, § 8, [18601 MASS. REV. STAT. 621.
95. Haskins, qui tam, v. Newcomb, 2 Johns. 405 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (fine for
unlawful compounding); see statute cited note 91 supra.
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to prosecute was vested in the government." Thus the government
could pardon the entire penalty where as before it could only pardon
its share. Various means were utilized to accomplish this centralization
of control.
The most direct means to vest control of penal actions in the gov-
ernment were amendments which either specifically repealed the in-
former provision or which required a penal action to be prosecuted
by a state's attorney. 97  In some instances the states opted for partial
control of the informers. This partial control was accomplished in
one of two ways. Either the use of informers was restricted 8 or the
government was provided with authority to intervene in an informer's
suit.99
Another means of centralizing the control of penal actions was ac-
complished by revoking the informer's share of a penalty. This was
done either expressly or impliedly. When a statutory provision giving
an informer a share of the penalty was repealed, the would-be in-
former's basis for bringing a qui tam suit was removed, as was his
incentive. 100 Some amendments and acts provided that all proceeds
from fines, penalties or forfeitures would accrue to the state or a
named public cause. Such provisions were occasionally interpreted as
an implied repeal of informer's shares in all statutes.10 1
96. The 1943 amendment to The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1970)
prohibits informer suits brought on evidence already in the hands of the federal gov-
ernment. Sheer v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 149 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
326 U.S. 762 (1945). The obvious purpose of this amendment was to effectuate the
government's choice of either prosecuting or ignoring an alleged false claim.
97. In Williams v. Wells Fargo & Express Co., 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910), the
court discussed a statute containing an apparent conflict regarding who could prosecute.
One section of the act gave a share of the penalty to one who prosecuted for it.
This would seem to give an informer the implied right to initiate proceedings under
the act. Another section required all prosecutions to be conducted by federal prose-
cutors. The court held that under these circumstances an informer could not proceed
qui tam. See also Rosenberg v. Union Iron Works, 109 F. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1901);
State v. Marietta & North Ga. R.R., 108 N.C. 24, 12 S.E. 1041 (1891).
98. See note 93 supra.
99. Under The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 232(C) (1970), the government
has sixty days to intervene.
100. See generally Hibbard v. Parmenter & Polsey Fertilizer Co., 70 N.H. 156,
46 A. 683 (1900).
101. The court in Dutton v. Fowler, 27 Wis. 427 (1871) held that all the proceeds
from a fine accrued to the county in which the conduct being penalized occurred.
The court in Southern Express Co. v. Commonwealth, 92 Va. 59, 22 S.E. 809 (1895),
avoided the problem by calling the penalty a forfeiture, not a fine for a crime.
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Courts also restricted the use of qui tam. A judicial means of pre-
cluding informer suits was to label them criminal as opposed to civil,
and then refuse to permit private parties to bring them.Y°2 Such a
characterization was a break from the English practice. 103
The frequency of qui tam suits also underwent change in the nine-
teenth century. Initially qui tam was very popular. Towards the end
of the nineteenth century, however, it was employed less and less. One
reason for the reduction in qui tam suits stems from legislation which
nearly eliminated all qui tam statutes. There is no evidence of a con-
certed effort to abolish qui tam; rather, there appears to have been a
steady erosion of the informer actions. The Connecticut experience
furnishes an example of this erosion. There the number of informer
actions was reduced gradually by statutory revisions in the latter quar-
ter of the nineteenth century. Prior to these revisions, informer ac-
tions played a significant role in the Connecticut courts. 04
The federal experience with qui tam was quite similar to that of the
states'. So long as qui tam was necessary to enforce the penal laws,0 5
Cf. State v. Indiana & Ill. S.R.R., 32 N.E. 817 (1892). In State v. Maultsby, 139
N.C. 583, 51 S.E. 956 (1905), the court said that an informer could have a share of
a penalty, but not of a fine. A "penalty" was defined as a "sum certain," while a
"fine" was described as "discretionary within the limits prescribed and is paid to the
state." Id. at 585, 51 S.E. at 956.
102. Three principal techniques were employed to determine whether an action
was criminal or civil. Some courts look to the procedure employed: Canfield v.
Mitchell, 43 Conn. 169 (1875); State v. McConnell, 70 N.H. 158 (1900); Waters v.
Day, 10 Vt. 487 (1838). Other courts considered the nature of the penalty. In
United States v. Claflin, 97 U.S. 546 (1878), the Court termed a fine of twice the
value of goods smuggled "remedial," as opposed to a forfeiture or penalty which was
considered "penal." Id. at 552-53. But see Palmer v. Conly, 4 Denio 374 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1847) (comparing remedial penalties to punitive penalties); Cummings v. Board
of Educ. of Okla. City, 190 Okla. 533, 125 P.2d 989 (1942). The third technique
which the courts have employed to distinguish between penal and civil actions has
been to consider the kind of conduct prohibited. An activity, otherwise lawful, which
is made unlawful could be prosecuted by means of a civil suit. Ott v. Jordan, 116 Pa.
218, 9 A. 321 (1887).
103. In discussing penal actions, of which qui tam was a variety, Blackstone made
it clear that an informer was suing to recover a penalty and in so doing was en-
forcing a criminal statute. 2 BLACKSTONE 437.
104. A comparison of the Revised Code of Connecticut of 1874 with the subse-
quent revisions of 1888 and 1902 reveals that most of the forty-six qui tam statutes
permitted under the 1874 Code were eliminated by one or the other of the subsequent
revisions.
105. See the discussion of the False Claims Act of 1863, 89 CONrG. REc.
10696-97 (1943) (remarks of Senator Langer quoting earlier remarks of Senator Van
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it was utilized. During the latter part of the nineteenth century the
federal informer provisions were gradually reduced. Finally, in 1943,
an amendment was proposed to eliminate one of the last remaining in-
former provisions of any consequence.10 6  The amendment was re-
jected, but only remnants remained of a once important statutory
scheme.
American judicial attitudes toward qui tam were also mixed, as
evidenced by Mr. Justice Black's opinion in Marcus v. Hess. 07 In
that case the Circuit Court of Appeal's decision had started from the
premise "that qui tam or informer actions have always been regarded
with disfavor" by the courts. 10 8  In reversing the lower court, Black
stated:
We cannot accept either the interpretive approach or the actual decision
of the court below. Qui tam suits have been frequently permitted by
legislative action and have not been without defense by the courts.10 9
Black's favorable attitude towards qui tam was clear from the following
broad language in footnote four of the opinion:
Statutes providing for a reward to informers which do not specifically
either authorize or forbid the informer to institute the action are con-
strued to authorize him to sue."10
Black cited Adams v. Woods"" as authority for this statement. This
was too expansive a reading of that case. In Adams, Chief Justice
Marshall was confronted with a statute which by clear implication
gave an informer a right to bring an action." 2  Marshall was not dis-
cusing a statute which was vague as to when informers could sue.
Despite Black's overreading, it was nonetheless clear from Marcus that
Nuys). Davies indicates that there were other reasons for the employment of qul tam
informers, but he does not suggest what these reasons were. DAVIES 25 n.2.
106. H.R. 1203, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1943.
107. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 541 (1943).
108. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 177 F.2d 233, 235 (3rd Cir.), aff'd,
317 U.S. 537 (1943).
109. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
110. Id. at 541 n.4.
111. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336 (1805).
112. The Court considered the Slave Trade Law of 1794, Act of Mar. 22, 1794
ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 346, which stated:
Violators ...shall forfeit and pay the sum of $2,000, one moiety to the
use of the United States, and the other moeity to the use of him or her who
shall sue for and prosecute the same. (Emphasis added).
For a similar analysis of this construction, see Note, 17 LOYOLA L. Ruv. 757, 761
(1971).
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qui tam was favorably regarded, if not by all courts, at least by the
Supreme Court in 1943.
What emerges from this historical evolution is recognition that in
America, as earlier in England, qui tam proceedings began as a useful and
perhaps necessary supplement to the efforts at law enforcement of in-
adequate public agencies. As the public agencies became more ef-
fective, the need for qui tam actions diminished. The legislatures
and courts, responding to this reduced need, gradually applied a
myriad of procedural and doctrinal" 3 restrictions on qui tam proceed-
ings. Thus, as in the English experience, American qui tam became
beclouded with misconceptions and uncertainties.
V. A SUGGESTED ANALYISiS
A. General Analysis
Despite these uncertainties, statutes providing for qui tam suits still
exist in the United States. In some cases, existence of legislation per-
mitting these suits might be attributed to legislative indifference or
oversight, but there are examples of both state and federal statutes
which remain in effect and which have not been overlooked. 114
As was true in the nineteenth century, contemporary statutes pro-
viding that informers can share in a penalty, fine or forfeiture are
phrased in various ways. Judicial interpretation is frequently necessary
to determine when such phrases authorize a qui tam proceeding.115
There are, unfortunately few recent decisions on these questions of
statutory construction. This problem of statutory interpretation can be
best broken down into two elements. First, the legislature's general
attitude towards qui tam must be determined. Secondly, assuming a
favorable general attitude, the court must determine whether the par-
ticular statute before it permits a qui tam action.
113. The propriety of allowing a private individual to enforce a criminal statute by
means of a civil action necessarily requires a consideration of the doctrine of "prose-
cutor's discretion" and the conflicting policy arguments. Such a consideration is en-
tirely separate from divining legislative intent from statutory restrictions. See gener-
ally Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutor's Discretion, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 64 (1948); Note, 17 LOYOLA L. REv. 749, 759-60 (1971).
114. For a recent decision acknowledging the currency of qui tam, see Lanne v.
City of Bayonne, 7 N.J. Super. Ct. 169, 72 A.2d 397 (1950).
115. New York permits both informer suits, N.Y. Civ. PRAc. LAw § 7-203
(McKinney 1963), and actions on statutes by aggrieved parties, N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW
§ 7-202 (McKinney 1963).
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The first element involves the existence of a legislative pronounce-
ment permitting or precluding qui tam suits. Recently such pro-
nouncements have been issued from both federal and state legisla-
tures. The best example of congressional attitude is legislation dealing
with the Informer Act.11 In 1943, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives proposed an amendment to abolish this act."1 7 The Senate refused
to accept this abolition,"18 but agreed to limit the act. 1 9 Again, in
1960, the act was the subject of congressional concern, but as in 1943
the qui tam procedure was retained. 120 Such activity indicates both an
awareness and an approval of the qui tam provisions in the Informers
Act.
The attitude of state legislatures towards qui tam is also reflected in
recent statutes. A Virginia statute provides that an informer or person
prosecuting may have part of a fine.' 2' In this context "person prose-
cuting" does not refer to the state's attorney but rather a private party.
In comparison, a Vermont statute requires that all fines "shall belong
and be paid to the state."' 122 The latter statute precludes the bringing of
a qui tam suit in Vermont as the private party or informer is provided
no interest in the recovery of the penalty. Such suits had previously
been permitted in Vermont. 23
In North Carolina, an amendment to the constitution provided that
the net proceeds of all penalties, fines and forfeitures would go to the
school fund. 24  There was a lively controversy as to whether this pre-
cluded an informer from bringing a qui tam suit to recover a part of a
penalty given to one who would "sue for the same." The court re-
116. H.R. 1203, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. (1943). During the course of the debate
on the amendment, the False Claims Act was referred to as the Informers Act.
89th CONG. Rac. 10751, 10845 (1943).
117. See note 106 supra.
118. The Senate insisted on its amendment to H.R. 1203, 89th CONa. REc. 10845
(1943).
119. 89 CONG. REC. 10752 (1943).
120. The 1960 amendment was minor in scope. It is mentioned at this point only
to indicate that congress is currently aware of the False Claims Act.
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-344 (1950). West Virginia allows the prosecutor to
recover a share of the penalty if his name appears on the indictment. W. VA. CODE
§ 62-4-2 (1966).
122. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13 § 7252 (1958). Maryland has a similar statute. MD.
ANN. CODE Art. 38 § 3 (1957).
123. Rev. Stat. ch. 105 § 3 [18421 Vt. Comp. Stat. 589.
124. N.C. CONST. art. 9, § 7. This provision was added as an amendment to
N.C. CoNsT. Art. 9, § 5.
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solved the issue by retaining the informer's share, and his right to sue
for it.12 5
Once it has been determined that a legislature has an announced
policy in favor of qui tam suits, or at least has not precluded such
proceedings, the question then becomes in what instances are such
suits authorized. As discussed above, qui tam statutes either ex-
pressly or impliedly give an informer or aggrieved party the right to
institute proceedings.126 For analytical purposes, penalty provisions
can be broken down into three categories: the first category includes
express grants to sue qui tam; the second gives permission by a clear
implication; and the third category includes those statutes which merely
give an informer a share of those penalties that he is helpful in ob-
taining.
The wording of express grants to proceed qui tam vary. The fed-
eral Informers Act spells out in great detail the procedure by which a
person suing "as well for himself as for the United States," may pro-
ceed qui tam. 27 State statutes authorizing a qui tam suit by an ex-
press provision within the penalty section generally do not provide for
so much detail as the Informers Act. These state statutes provide a
wide variety of provisions, and in some instances the private party is
given an uncontrolled right to proceed:
Any person who may be aggrieved or injured by the violation of section
59-201 may prosecute the violator in a criminal action by his own
attorney, without the intervention of the county attorney . . .128
In other instances the private party's right to proceed qui tam is re-
stricted:
Upon the refusal, failure, or neglect of the proper officers of the States
or of any county, township, city, town or school district, to institute or
diligently prosecute proper proceedings . . . any resident taxpayer...
may in the name of the State of Oklahoma as plaintiff, institute and
125. See Sutton v. Phillips, 116 N.C. 502, 21 S.E. 968 (1895), in which the
North Carolina court said that an amendment to the state constitution which gave
the clear proceeds of all penalties to the school fund was not a bar to an informer suit
(two judges dissenting); accord, Barnett v. Atlantic & Pacific R.R. Co., 68 Mo. 56
(1878); Lynch v. The Steamer "Economy", 27 Wis. 69 (1871).
126. See notes 80-81 supra and accompanying text.
127. 31 U.S.C. §§ 231-235 (1964). The qui tam provision is included in 31 U.S.C.
§ 232 (1964).
128. NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-204 (1943). One state openly refers to such statutes as
qui tam. TENN. CODE § 43-2006 (1964).
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maintain for the recovery of such property. .120
A clear implication of the right to sue qui tam arises when a share
of the penalty is given to one who will sue for it. The same can be
said of a penalty to be recovered "at the suit of the informer."' 30  The
manner in which the informer's share of the penalty is provided gives
a clear indication that the state's legislature intended to permit an
informer to bring a qui tam suit.
The third category of penalty provisions has caused some conflict
among the courts as to whether such provisions authorize a private
party to institute a qui tam proceeding. There is considerable doubt
as to whether a qui tam suit may be brought where the penalty pro-
vision only acknowledges the informer's share. 1 ' Most courts, includ-
ing federal, have regarded such provisions as an insufficient basis to dem-
onstrate a legislative intent to authorize qui tam suits. 32  A few courts
have ruled to the contrary. 3 The penal provision in the Refuse Act
falls within this last category and provides an example of contempor-
ary judicial interpretation.
B. The Refuse Act Cases
In each of the Refuse Act cases, the courts stated at least three rea-
sons supporting their dismissals. Some of these reasons were repeated
in several opinions; others were not. No single reason was accepted
by all the courts; however, one approach was widely accepted. Most
courts asserted the plaintiffs had no authority to sue. The courts
used two lines of reasoning to arrive at this conclusion. The first line
asserted that the Justice Department had the exclusive right to pro-
secute violators of the Refuse Act. The second denied the informer's
right to sue. The courts expressed these lines of reasoning in a var-
iety of ways.
The most prevalent rationale was that § 413 precluded qui tam
suits.' This section specifically provides for enforcement by the
129. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62 § 373 (1963).
130. GA. CODE ANN. § 62-106 (1966).
131. Federal Refuse Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407, 411, 413 (1969).
132. See, e.g., Williams v. Wells Fargo & Express Co., 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910);
Smith v. Look, 108 Mass. 139 (1871); Almy v. Harris, 5 Johns. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1809); Allen v. Craig, 102 Ore. 254, 201 P. 1079 (1921).
133. Chicago and Alton R.R. v. Howard, 38 I1. 415 (1865).
134. Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp. 695 (D.
Conn.), affd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971).
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Justice Department.1 3  Even if the penalty provision authorized an in-
former to sue qui tam, § 413 nullified this grant. Two federal cases
support this argument. 1 6 There is little authority to the contrary.137
Six cases asserted a similar rationale.3 8 This involved two steps.
First, there was a two-fold conclusion that the Refuse Act was a criminal
statute and could not be enforced by a civil action. Secondly, only
proper authorities, in this case the Justice Department, could enforce
criminal statutes. Two courts offered a slight variation on the first
step.' 30 These courts argued that qui tam actions could be brought
only for civil penalties and, since § 411 imposed a criminal fine, qui tam
did not lie. Either line of reasoning relied upon the conclusion that
135. E.g., Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. U.S. Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412, 415
(M.D. Ala. 1971).
136. Williams v. Wells Fargo & Express Co., 177 F. 352 (8th Cir. 1910); Rosenburg
v. Union Iron Works, 109 F. 844 (N.D. Cal. 1910); 33 U.S.C. § 413 (1964).
[Tihe Department of Justice shall conduct the legal proceedings necessary
to enforce the provisions of (this act) ... and it shall be the duty of
United States attorneys to vigorously prosecute all offenders against the state
137. The court in United States v. Griswold, 26 F. Cas. 42 (No. 15,266) (D. Ore.
1877) [in construing the False Claims Act] rejected an argument that qui tam
enforcement of that act which was expressly provided for under Act of March 2, 1863,
ch. 67 § 5, 12 STAT. 696, codified as 31 U.S.C. § 233 (1970), or under a general stat-
ute which requires United States District Attorneys to prosecute civil actions in
which the United States is a concerned party, Rev. Stat. § 367, revised and codified as
28 U.S.C. § 517 (1970). At least one authority thought this case controlling in the
Refuse Act situation. See Note, Qui Tam Actions and the Rivers and Harbors Act,
23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 173, 201-05 (1971). One author construed § 413 to cover
some, but not all proceedings. Thus he concluded the United States Attorney was not
required to bring all suits to enforce the act. Note, Qui Tam Actions Under the 1899
Refuse Act: Possibility of Individual Legal Action to Prevent Water Pollution, 36 Mo.
L. REv. 498, 511 (1971).
138. Gerbing v. ITr Rayonier, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. Fla. 1971); Lavagnino
v. Porto Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971); Bass Angler Sports-
man's Soc'y v. Scholze Tannery, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 339 (E.D. Texas 1971); United
States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971);
Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F. Supp.
302 (S.D. Texas 1971); Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Steel Corp., 324 F.
Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971).
139. Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp. 695 (D.
Conn.), aff'd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971); Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. U.S. Steel
Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412 (N.D. Ala.), aff'd, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971). Two
courts referred to the penalty as a criminal penalty and reasoned that qui tam lay only
to recover a civil penalty, Gerbing v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 332 F. Supp. 309 (M.D.
Fla. 1971); United States, qui tam, Matthews v. Florida-Vanderbilt Development Corp.,
326 F. Supp. (S.D. Fla. 1971).
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the Refuse Act is a criminal statute. The courts arrived at this con-
clusion by an examination of the wording of § 41 1.140
Some courts approached the question of who had authority to pro-
secute violators of the Refuse Act from a different standpoint. These
courts chose to deny informers the right to proceed qui tam on the
grounds that Congress had not given informers that right. Five of
these courts concluded that the Refuse Act gave neither express nor
implied authority to sue qui tam. 4' This was an application of the
English test.142  Other courts took a slightly different approach and
arrived at the same conclusion. One such approach was advanced in
Bass Angler v. U.S. Plywood.148  The court there stated that the in-
former's right to a share of a penalty depended upon three condi-
tions: criminal prosecution under § 411, a conviction, and a fine
imposed upon sentence. The court then concluded, "The inform-
er's rights, therefore, are entirely dependent on, and inseparable from,
the criminal proceeding brought by the Justice Department, the party
authorized to institute such suit.' 4 4  Once again a court presumed
that a criminal proceeding was required to enforce the act. In this in-
stance the presumption was not expressly supported. Similarly,
another court noted that a successful prosecution could lead to a sen-
tence of a fine, imprisonment, or both. A private party could not
bring a civil suit which could lead to the imposition of a prison term;
therefore, the court concluded, an informer could not sue qui tam
under the Refuse Act.' 45  This opinion came the closest to giving a
clear explanation for calling the Refuse Act a criminal statute.
Some courts attempted to divine the congressional intent of the act.
Each of these courts reached a separate conclusion. One court stated
that informers were disfavored in 1899, the year in which the Refuse
140. See, e.g., Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., 330 F. Supp.
695, 697 (D. Conn.), affd, - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971).
141. Lavagnino v. Porto Mix Concrete, Inc., 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971);
Enquist v. Quaker Oats Co., 327 F. Supp. 347 (D. Neb. 1971); United States ex rel.
Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87 (D. Minn. 1971); United States,
qui tam, Matthews v. Florida-Vanderbilt Development Corp., 326 F. Supp. 289 (S.D.
Fla. 1971); Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Steel Corp., 324 F. Supp. 412
(N.D. Ala.), af 'd, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971).
142. See note 34 supra and accompanying text.
143. Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion, Inc., 324 F. Supp,
302 (S.D. Texas 1971).
144. Id. at 306.
145. Durning v. ITT Rayonier Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (N.D. Wash. 1970).
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Act was enacted. 140  This conclusion was an accurate appraisal of the
legislative attitude towards qui tam at the turn of the century. Thus,
in a doubtful case, it could be argued that Congress did not intend to
provide for informer suits. The second court's conclusion was that
Congress intended the informer's share in § 411 as a reward, not as a
means to sue.'47  The court did not support this conclusion. It is
strange reasoning, for every informer statute includes a reward for the
party who prosecutes. It is the providing for a share combined with
a grant to sue that permits an informer's suit to be brought qui tam.
Thus to say that any particular informer's share was nothing more
than a reward begged the question. The court should have gone on
to say that a grant to sue was not provided in the statute.
Two more reasons were given for these dismissals. One court an-
nounced that qui tam had not found its way into the common law.14
This argument limited the availability of qui tam suits to those which
were specifically provided for by statute. Such an argument was not
an accurate statement of English law.' 49 Furthermore the status of
the common law qui tam has never been resolved in American courts.
Thus the argument stands as a bare conclusion. Another court specu-
lated that a criminal suit brought by the Justice Department and a
qui tam action filed by an informer could be brought simultaneously
to prosecute the same offense. When this occurred, a court would
not know what to do.' 50 The court offering this speculation was ob-
viously unaware of the rule in Rex v. Hymen'5 ' which resolved this
problem.
The rule of that case is that the government may sue for the in-
former's share of the penalty if, and only if, no informer has initiated a
suit prior to the government's filing. If this condition is met, no in-
former can sue or recover any part of the penalty. 5 ' On the other
146. United States ex rel. Mattson v. Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87
(D. Minn. 1971).
147. Durning v. ITT Rayonier, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446 (N.D. Wash. 1970).
148. Bass Angler Sportsman's Soc'y v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 324 F.
Supp. 302 (S.D. Texas 1971).
149. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
150. Duming v. ITT Rayonier Inc., 325 F. Supp. 446, 447 (N.D. Wash. 1970).
151. See note 18 supra.
152. United States v. Anaconda Wire & Cable Co., 52 F. Supp. 824, 826 (E.D.
Pa. 1943); United States ex rel. Benjamin v. Hendrick, 52 F. Supp. 60, 61 (S.D.
N.Y. 1943).
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hand, once an informer has initiated his suit, and assuming arguendo
that he can proceed under the act, the right to continue vests abso-
lutely in the informer and can not be interfered with by the govern-
ment.153  There is, then, no possibility of two suits being prosecuted
at one time.
By the variety of reasons given for these dismissals, it is evident that
the courts were unsure of their position. Actually the question of
whether qui tam is provided for in a statute is rather easily resolved.
The English test, which requires that a statute provide an express
grant or clear implication for an informer to sue qui fain, is widely
accepted' 54 and relatively easy to apply. The wording of § 411,
"one-half of said fine to be paid to the person or persons giving in-
formation which shall lead to conviction,"'' 1 clearly does not give an
informer an express grant to sue. It is equally obvious that this lan-
guage does not clearly imply that an informer can initiate an action to
recover the penalty. Rather, it appears the informer must await gov-
ernmental prosecution. Then, if the government prevails and a fine is
imposed, the informer may assert his right to half of the fine."
Even if § 411 authorizes informers to sue, however, § 413 nullifies
this grant. The law on this construction is clear and well established,5 7
153. "Even the sovereign has no right to interfere. The first plaintiff has sole
control of the action. . . ." United States v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 41 F. Supp. 574, 575
(S.D. N.Y. 1941). See also note 78 supra and accompanying text.
154. See note 132 supra. However, there is a contrary view which contends ".
qui tam actions are allowed if part of a pecuniary penalty is specified for an informer,
unless the statute expressly prohibits this method of enforcement." Note, Qul Tam
Actions and the Rivers and Harbors Act, 23 CAsE W. Ras. L. Rav. 173, 212 (1971).
The author of this view relies upon Justice Black's dictum in United States ex rel.
Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943), discussed at notes 107-112 supra, and accom-
panying text, and upon two other federal court opinions, United States v. Stocking,
87 F. 857 (D. Mont. 1898), and United States v. Griswold, 26 F. Cas. 42 (No. 15,266)
(D. Ore. 1877). These last two cases noted that the adopted statutory construction
rule for determining whether qui tam lay was that where a penalty was given in part,
"to whoever would sue for the same", that penalty could be sued for in a qul tam
suit. The words "whoever would sue for the same" constitutes an implied grant of
authority to sue. See note 81 supra. Such language would make no sense if informers
were not allowed to sue for the penalty. By using that language, the legislature gives
informers the right to proceed. This contrary view, then, is an overreading of the
authorities it cites and an ignoring of the accepted position which the Refuse Act
cases reflect.
155. 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1964).
156. For a case in which this procedure was successfully followed, see United States
v. Transit-Mix Concrete Corp., 2 E.R.C. 1074 (S.D. N.Y. 1970).
157. See note 97 supra and accompanying text.
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and was applied in half of the Refuse Act cases.
A third reason qui tam is not available under the Refuse Act is un-
assailable. As the court noted in Durning v. ITT Rayonier,1 8
§ 411 provides for the possible imposition of a prison term. Under
these circumstances, only the state should be permitted to prosecute
violations of the act.
These reasons apply to suits by informers, but not necessarily to a
suit brought by a plaintiff who has suffered a particular injury over
and above that suffered by the general public; he sues for a remedy as
well as a share of the penalty. As discussed above, such plaintiffs
were often distinguished from informers. On occasions these distinc-
tions provided grounds for different results in identical cause of action.
So far, only the plaintiff in Lavagnino v. Porto Mix Concrete, Inc.,'59
has attempted to employ an aggrieved party argument as an alterna-
tive means to authorize a qui tam suit. Faced with this problem, the
court merely construed the Refuse Act as applying only to interfer-
ences with navigation. 6 ' Since the plaintiff alleged damage to his
real property he could not recover under the Refuse Act.
VI. POSSIBLE FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
There is little chance that courts will permit an informer to bring
a qui tam suit on the Refuse Act. That does not, however, necessarily
preclude all private parties from suing under the Refuse Act. Private
suits may be attempted by aggrieved parties such as the plaintiff in
Lavagnino.'6' These plaintiffs may be able to resort to common law
qui tam suits.
As discussed above, qui tam was, in part, a common law remedy. 62
Although aggrieved parties no longer needed the qui tam technique
after the fourteenth century, there was no outright abolition of it as a
158. 325 F. Supp. 446, 448 (W.D. Wash. 1970).
159. Lavagnino v. Porto Mix Concrete, 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971).
160. The court did, however, note some conflict. Id. at 325-26. For an example
of cases holding that obstruction to navigation was not an essential element of the
offense see United States v. Maplewood Poultry Co., 327 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Me.
1971); United States v. U.S. Steel Corp., 328 F. Supp. 354 (N.D. Ind. 1970). See also
Kalur v. Resor, 3 E.R.C. 1458 (D.D.C. 1972).
161. Lavagnino v. Porto Mix Concrete, 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971).
162. See notes 21-22 supra and accompanying text.
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non-statutory procedure. 1 63 Thus it is possible to argue that it still
exists and has been adopted in this country along with the rest of the
common law of England.""
It could be argued that the thirteenth century English suitors reason for
bringing a suit qui tam finds a suitable analogy in our country today.
As shown above, those early English suitors often desired to plead
their cases in royal courts.165 If the plaintiff's grievance also touched
a matter of royal concern the plaintiff could join the two grievances
and proceed qui tam in the royal courts. A twentieth century suitor
finds himself in a somewhat analogous situation if he desires to bring
his suit in federal court. If the conduct giving rise to his grievance
would also affect a national interest-as evidenced by its violation of
a federal act-then the suitor would be confronted with the common
law qui tam situation. How should the federal courts respond to such
a problem?
The use of the early qui tam procedure would be questionable for
several reasons. First, the existence of a common law remedy which
lay dormant for five centuries is extremely doubtful. Even if it can be
said to exist in the English common law, it may not have been adopted
in this country. Secondly, it can be argued that since Parliament pro-
vided by statute for suits by aggrieved parties which could be pleaded
qui tam then no other wrongs than those covered could be redressed
in this manner. This argument would consider such enactments as
impliedly preempting the common law qui tam.
The arguments challenging the current status of common law qui
tam, are formidable. On a theoretical plane they may be overwhelm-
ing, but as a practical matter courts may still decide to permit a com-
mon law qui tam suit. Such a decision could be based on one of two
grounds. First, the courts could decide that qui tam as a common
law remedy is and always has been allowed in our courts. Alter-
natively, the courts could formulate a common law qui tam remedy.
Any attempt to argue the existence of a common law qui tam
suit also must recognize that our system of federalism raises the level
of complexity of qui tam jurisprudence. Even if qui tam was adopted
as part of American law, a plaintiff faces a formidable problem in
163. See note 25 supra.
164. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text.
165. See note 23 supra.
[Vol. 1972:81
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1972/iss1/7
DEVELOPMENT OF QUI TAM
bringing a common law qui tam suit in federal court. An argument
that qui tam is a part of American common law initially must over-
come Mr. Justice Brandeis' dictum in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins 66
to the effect that there is "no federal common law." This blanket as-
sertion was invalidated by subsequent decisions, 16 7 but a qui tam
plaintiff in federal court would still face substantial problems. The
Erie decision remains good law as to the substantive law applicable in
federal court. What procedural law is to be used in federal court pre-
sents another problem. Supposedly, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure are controlling in federal courts, but when the rules do not
cover a given procedure, such as qui tam, the federal courts might
look outside the rules.168 The question of whether a common law
qui tam action is a matter of substantive law or merely procedural,
together with a resolution of the attendant issues it raises in the fed-
eral context is beyond the scope of this note. They are issues that
must be recognized, however, should one attempt to rely on a common
law qui tam remedy.
Should the plaintiff prevail in this attempt, or if in the state context
a common law qui tam remedy should be recognized, then private
parties would be indirectly able to enforce various statutes. The
granting of this authorization would not be so unheard of as the Refuse
Act decisions would indicate.
In dismissing the qui tam suits under the Refuse Act, the courts
have ignored a seemingly obvious analogy to the Security and Ex-
change Act'61 cases that have given private parties a right of action
under a governmentally enforced statute. The analogy is not applicable
as to the informer provision in the Refuse Act for there is no such pro-
vision in the Exchange Act. But, in the securities cases the Supreme
Court has supplied relief to aggrieved parties under a criminal statute
which does not expressly provide for such relief. The Court held simply
166. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
167. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty
Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). Perhaps the strongest attack
on the Erie doctrine is found in Keeffe, Gilhooley, Baily & Day, Weary Erie, 34
CORNELL L.Q. 494 (1949).
168. Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation, 337 U.S. 541 (1949);
D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. F.D.I.C., 315 U.S. 442 (1942). See also Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460 (1965); Note, Erie v. Tompkins and the Federal Rules, 62 HARv.
L. REv. 1030 (1949).
169. 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1971).
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that relief should be forthcoming to a private party whose injury resulted
from the violation of a federal statute,170 even if there was no express
provision concerning a private remedy. A good argument could be
made that if implied private rights of action are allowed under the
Exchange Act as a means of effectuating the congressional purpose
of protecting investors, a similar action should be allowed under the
Refuse Act, if the purpose of the latter statute is to prevent pollution
and protect persons damaged therebyY'
The Refuse Act courts are probably correct in holding that the in-
former provision of the act in and of itself does not give a private
party a cause of action. But to extend those holdings to say that a
private civil action cannot be used to enforce an otherwise govern-
mentally enforced statute is clearly contradictory to the holdings in the
Exchange Act cases. A closer look at these cases will show the validity
of the analogy.
The Exchange Act does not expressly provide for private actions
as a means of enforcing sections 10(b) and 14(a),172 nevertheless,
the Supreme Court approved an implied private right of action under
these sections. In the leading case on private rights of action under
the Exchange Act, J.L Case v. Borak,173 the Court directly addressed
the issue of whether or not a private right of action should be implied
for injury resulting from alleged violations of § 14(a) of the act. The
Court could easily have concluded that if Congress had intended to
provide for such actions, it would have done so expressly, 17" but it
reached the opposite conclusion and allowed the action.
The purpose of section 14(a) is to prevent management or others
from obtaining authorization for corporate action by means of de-
170. See, e.g., Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970); J.I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Karden v. National Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.
Pa. 1946).
171. See note 160 supra. One court noted the existence of such relief to aggrieved
parties and also noted the similarity to qui tam. United States ex rel. Mattson v.
Northwest Paper Co., 327 F. Supp. 87, 93, n.9 (D. Minn. 1971). See also Connecticut
Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co. Inc., - F.2d - (2d Cir. 1971) (recognizing
possibility of this argument if an aggrieved party were involved).
172. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78b, n(a) (1971). Express private rights of action are provided
in other sections. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e), 78p(b), 78r(a), 78cc (1971).
173. 377 U.S. 426 (1964). See also Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375
(1970), affirming Borak.
174. Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 77k, 1 (1971) with note 172 supra.
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ceptive or inadequate disclosure in proxy solicitation. 17 5 In reference
to the purposes of this section the Borak Court stated, "While this
language makes no specific reference to a private right of action,
among its chief purposes is the 'protection of investors,' which cer-
tainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to
achieve that result.' 176  With this statement of congressional purpose
175. [.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
176. Id. at 432. Other courts have found implied private rights of action under
§ 10 of the Exchange Act on a statutory tort theory. See, e.g., Kardon v. National
Gypsum, 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The statutory tort argument is grounded
upon 2 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 286 (1938) which states that a civil suit for viola-
tion of a legislative enactment is proper, provided that such enactment was intended to
prevent the type of injury which occurred and to protect the particular plaintiff
alleging the measure's violation. In other words, the violation of a statutory command
is wrong in itself and liability follows whenever the prohibited conduct injures a party
whom the statute was designed to protect (in this case investors under the Exchange
Act). A private right of action on this theory is premised on the lack of an effective
common law or statutory remedy. See Note, An Implied Private Right of Action
Under Section 16(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 23 CASE W. RES.
L. REv. 155 (1971) suggesting that courts have found implied private rights of ac-
tions under the Exchange Act on three theories: (1) statutory tort, (2) congressional
purpose (Borak supra note 173), (3) jurisdictional grants in a particular act. As to the
latter, the author comments that courts have held that the grant of jurisdiction includes
the concomitant power to make jurisdiction effective. Id. at 159, citing Deckert v.
Independent Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940).
The statutory tort theory, that an injured party must be given a remedy under the
Exchange Act, has been somewhat modified under § 16(b) [15 U.S.C. § 78p (1971)]
of the act. The purpose of § 16(b) is to prevent corporate insiders from taking ad-
vantage of their positions by trading for short term profits in the corporation's stock.
Section 16(b) provides that the corporation, or should the corporation fail to bring an
action, a stockholder can bring an action against the insider who traded short term.
The importance of allowing a stockholder to bring a derivative action against the in-
sider is that the stockholder is only very indirectly injured, and he recovers nothing for
bringing the action-the corporation recovers the penalties levied against the wrong-
doing insiders. Thus, the purpose of allowing a stockholder, as a private party, to
bring an action is not to provide him relief for a tortious injury, but to supply a
powerful method by which the section can be enforced.
This purpose distinguishes § 16(b) stockholder actions from § 14(a) actions where
the stockholder as an injured party seeks personal relief. Recognizing the purpose of
§ 16(b)--enforcement of the act-courts have fashioned penalties against violators
that are very severe. The penalty is fashioned on a maximum profit theory; i.e.
the court determines the maximum profit that the violator could have gained and
levies that penalty against him, even if the inside trading resulted in a substantial
loss to him. This indicates an independent purpose other than merely providing a
remedy for a private party plaintiff. See Smolowe v. Delendo Corp., 136 F.2d 231
(2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 751 (1944); Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 920 (1951); 2 L. Loss, SEcuRrrlIs REGULATION,
1037-1132 (2d ed. 1961). Taken collectively, these cases indicate not only a formula-
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as its basis, the Supreme Court concluded that "under the circum-
stances here it is the duty of the courts to be alert to provide such
remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional pur-
pose."'1 77 The remedy the Court made available to the aggrieved
plaintiff was a private right of action, which the Court implied from
the congressional purpose.17s  Underscoring this point, the Court
stated, "It is for the federal courts to adjust their remedies so as to
grant the necessary relief where federal secured rights are invaded."' 17
Prior to the Borak decision, the only means for punishing violation of
section 14(a) was by governmental action provided for in sections 27
and 32 of the act.'
The Court justified its holding that a private action would lie on
the grounds that the action would greatly enhance the effectiveness of
the Exchange Act, particularly since the Securities and Exchange
Commission did not have the resources necessary to regulate effectively
the proxies covered by the section.''
When a qui tam action was brought by an aggrieved person, his
primary purpose was to obtain a private remedy; effective enforcement
of public policy was a happy by-product. The analogies between the
implied private right of action under Exchange Act and an aggrieved
party qui tam action under the Refuse Act need not be belabored
further. Suffice it to say that the Supreme Court has provided for
an implied right of action as a remedy under a federal statute which
tion of a private remedy but also a means of enforcing the federal statute, i.e. a
merger of private and governmental interests.
177. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 431, 432 (1964).
178. For the remedies available under § 14(a), see Note, Private Remedies Avail-
able Under Section 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act 1934, 55 IowA L. REV.
657 (1970); "Since no specific remedies are set forth in Section 14(a), the federal
courts have wide discretion to formulate remedies for Section 14(a) violations
to meet the exigencies of each particular case in accord with basic principles laid
down in Borak. Within this broad framework of possible remedies courts have de-
veloped three general types of relief: injunction, recission of the transaction and resti-
tution of the consideration given by the plaintiff, and money damages." Id. at 659.
179. J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 431, 433 (1964).
180. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aa, ff (1971).
181. The Court stated that "The [Securities and Exchange] Commission advises that
it examines over 2,000 proxy statements annually and each of them must necessarily
be expedited. Time does not permit an independent examination of the facts set out in
the proxy material and this results in the Commission's acceptance of the representa-
tions contanied therein at their face value, unless contrary to other material on file
with it." 377 U.S. at 432. The Borak Court found the Commission's lack of re-
sources a good reason for providing for private actions.
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did not expressly provide for such relief. The Court thought it its
duty to supply such a remedy not only as a means of effectuating a
congressional purpose, but also as a means of supplying relief where
Congress had failed to do so.1 2
By allowing for a private right of action under the Exchange Act,
two interests are merged, one private, one public. The private interest
is the redress of a grievance, i.e. relief for violation of the federal
statute. The public interest served is the increased compliance with
federal statutes. Such a merger of interests was the very basis, his-
torically, for the existence of qui tam. 83 Perhaps giving an "implied
private right of action" is no different from allowing an aggrieved
party, such as the plaintiff in Lavagnina v. Porto Mix Concrete,
Inc.,8' to bring a suit qui tam. Is not the "implied private right of
action" of Borak merely another name for a common law qui tam suit
by an aggrieved party? If so, should not such an action be allowed
under the Refuse Act, not to recover a fine or penalty, but simply to
obtain a remedy for a particular injury?
VII. CONCLUSION
Qui tam is now over seven centuries old. It has gone through
periods of tremendous popularity during its long history; it has also
been subject to wholesale abuse and rigid control. Recently it has
fallen into disuse. There may now be reason for its revival. In de-
ciding whether to permit an aggrieved party to sue qui tam under the
Refuse Act or other statutes, the courts should not be influenced by
the unhappy history of qui tam actions by common informers. Rather,
they should consider whether or not such suits would contribute to the
effective enforcement of the statutory policy. The federal district
courts that have been faced with informers as qui tam plaintiffs have
not undertaken such a consideration. It may be hoped that the fore-
going discussion may provide some guidance to parties and courts
faced with that question.
182. In Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375 (1970) the Supreme Court
carried the Borak holding even further by allowing a private cause of action under
§ 14(a) even though it was not clear that the defendant's violations of the proxy rules
were the cause of plaintiff's injury.
183. The analogy is not perfect, for the king had something to gain, in addition to
the enforcement of the statutes, by the successful prosecution of an aggrieved party
qui tam. See notes 12-21 supra and accompanying text.
184. 330 F. Supp. 323 (D. Colo. 1971).
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